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Abstract:  Zentall’s (2016) model of cognitive dissonance is compatible with cognitive continuity 
between humans and nonhumans. It may help explain cognitive dissonance-like behavior in many 
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Zentall (2016) lays out a rather compelling case for explaining cognitive dissonance with a model 
that relies not on conscious control of behavior but on reinforcement and standard animal 
cognition approaches. The model may not necessarily satisfy those who are interested in 
conscious control of behavior in non-humans, but it is parsimonious and it also follows a standard 
approach used in biology. It does not imply that non-humans don’t experience dissonance in some 
fashion similar to humans, or that they do. It is quite possible that similar mechanisms are 
preserved in humans. 
 Tinbergen (1963) laid out his famous ‘four whys’ to be answered if one is to fully 
understand any characteristic, including behavior. These include two proximate causes, ontogeny 
and mechanism, and two ultimate causes, the evolutionary history of the characteristic and its 
adaptive value. As MacDougall-Shackelton (2011) points out, these are not competing 
explanations of a behavior. Although the word ‘ultimate’ seems to imply that such explanations 
Animal Sentience 2017.069:  Brodbeck & Brodbeck on Zentall on Cognitive Dissonance 
2 
 
are better than proximate ones, this is not the case. Confusion about this has led to much 
nonproductive debate. In explaining migration in birds functionally, in terms of the need to get to 
a warmer climate, MacDougall-Shackelton does not compete with the mechanistic explanation 
that circulating hormones induce migratory restlessness. Both explanations are correct, despite 
the fact that they take different perspectives; and both expand our knowledge of migration.  
 In human cognitive dissonance, there is not only an internal mechanism, but there is also 
the phenomenological aspect of self-justification. Zentall uses an excellent example about 
cigarette smokers to explain cognitive dissonance. Many psychoactive drugs have this paradoxical 
effect. We imagine more than one reader has had the experience of drinking too much alcohol 
and awaking the next day vowing never to drink again. Then, later that same day, they drink 
alcohol. They may justify these conflicting thoughts by rationalizing that they will only have one 
drink, or that they are just going to a bar to be social with friends, but this is what psychologists 
call cognitive dissonance.  
 Why then do people drink to excess or smoke cigarettes? Ingestion of psychoactive 
substances is physiologically rewarding. The mesolimbic dopamine system is activated whenever 
we do something pleasurable (Hancock & McKim, 2017): people develop smoking habits because 
it feels good. This is a mechanism for the cognitive dissonance associated with taking drugs.  
 The mechanistic account of cognitive dissonance may be something similar to Zentall’s 
(2016) model. What is the functional or adaptive explanation of the phenomenon? Animals, 
including humans, are susceptible to the ‘Concorde fallacy’. They tend to reason (fallaciously) that 
investing a high amount of effort makes sunk costs more valuable (Curio, 1987). Past effort could 
be used as a rule of thumb by foraging animals. They may ‘believe’ that something in which they 
have put a lot of effort is actually worth it because it often is (Kacelnik & Marsh, 2002).  
 It would be adaptive for humans to have an additional mechanism along with the rule of 
thumb. Whereas most of our cognition is inaccessible to consciousness, some of it is (Schacter, 
1987). Evolution may have selected for individuals who self-justify putting greater amounts of 
effort into foraging, for example. Such an approach to foraging could have been adaptive in the 
ancestral environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA), but we don’t live in the EEA. So today 
we see only the deleterious effects of cognitive dissonance.  
 The non-human data that Zentall (2016) describes appear to resemble cognitive 
dissonance in humans. There may even be a phenomenological aspect to pigeon cognition, 
although this is something we cannot know. When behavior has inputs and outputs similar to 
those of human behavior, it is tempting to give the phenomenon the same name (e.g., Brodbeck, 
1997, Shettleworth, 2012).  
 Zentall’s approach is consistent with the findings on cognitive dissonance in humans. An 
extra conscious mechanism (the self-justification aspect of cognitive dissonance) was selected for 
during our species’s evolutionary past. Some nonhuman species may also have a similar 
mechanism. Hence Zentall’s explanation is compatible with cognitive continuity between humans 
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